Posted on June 18th, 2023

RAHAB'S JUSTIFIABLE LIE by Jim West

When you leave your home and purposely leave one or more lights on, pensively ask yourself, "Am I really at bottom a situation ethicist?!" Situation ethics, you may recall, is the philosophy that was dished up with a startling alacrity a few years ago by Joseph Fletcher when he virtually asserted that morality must be determined by a non-inscripturated standard of personal love. In holding that there is no law but love the situationalist says "every man must do what is loving in his own eyes."

The Bible would put it into the prosecutable language of "every man did that which was right in his own eyes." Now, of course, we live in the Watergate and Korea-gate era; it is an age when Presidential commitments suddenly become "inoperative"; it is a time when judicial perjury as well as slander and libel have become almost unprosecutable crimes. One might ask, then, about the legitimacy of writing an article on Rahab's justifiable lie (on guard, but not checkmate!). Perjuries, Watergates, the breaking of conjugal vows, and certainly deceitful taking of ordination vows for the Gospel ministry where mental-dissent casuistry exists are clear examples of the sort of cunning that we do not condone. But does telling an untruth to a malefactor or even leaving the lights on in your home fall under the same censure as the examples previously enlisted?

It would be well for us to provide a montage of the different forms of deception that we (often unknowingly) practice regularly. For example, if one asserts that it is a misuse of Edison's light-bulb to deceive a would-be thief, he should think twice about discontinuing his paper and mail service while on vacation, and even (assuming a turbulent conscience) make certain that the living-room drapes are drawn lest any would-be thief is inadvertently bamboozled. Moreover, if one interprets the Bible to teach, "Thou shalt never tell a falsehood," the practical implications could be easily reduced to the ludicrous. We are acquainted, for example, with a man who in conversation tenaciously claimed that it was never right to tell a lie. Months later when his moral guard was lowered he was offered a "gift" in the form of a sign etched with the famous warning, BEWARE OF DOG. Of course, the one who was offered the gratuity did not have a dog. The offerer of the gift knew that, but the former did not know that the whole transaction was a charitable ruse to test the sterling character of his "never tell a lie" convictions. He smiled, thought about it, as the bearer of the present waited for the Trojan to accept his Trojan horse. Then came the climax of what was expected to be either a valiant refusal or a contradictory acceptance; he said, "I'll have to ask my wife."

Some Practicalities and Impracticalities

Our sign representing the imaginary canine is more than just the dramatic kernel of an amusing vignette. What it tells us is that Christians must realistically face the ramifications of their theological tenets and that if a believer holds that it is never right to tell a lie, he may not in good faith even nail a misleading BEWARE OF DOG sign on his fence. The reason? Because such a sign verbally deceives in that it does not accurately represent the reality of what it claims; it would have to fall under the censure of the Word of God. The "approbrium" of our BEWARE OF DOG sign would in fact be compounded by a serious, double aggravation: distant neighbors as well as scheming thieves would be misled to draw fallacious conclusions from erroneous premises.

When Rahab told her "fib" at Jericho in order to save the lives of the spies, she would have been dumbfounded to learn that her act of faith would become the controversial subject of increasing discussion for the next three thousand years of church history. Was Rahab a situation ethicist? Let us modernize the question. Was Corrie ten Boom a situation ethicist? Is it right to have a C.I.A.? Should a Christian work underground in the local police department? Is deception ever justified in fighting crime? You can see that our BEWARE OF DOG sign has some far-reaching ramifications into the personal lives of the people of God. The question is particularly relevant today when crime has crystallized itself into bureaucracies of totalitarian regimes as well as into the individual whims of private thugs. So the question about telling untruths to hoodlums is an intensely pastoral and practical problem.

If we accept as a "given" the elimination of all forms of deception, we are immediately confronted with a reductio ad absurdum. Football's famous "statue of liberty" play would be ipso facto eliminated. It would have been gross sin for a Sandy Koufax to throw a change-up when the batter had been just mesmerized by that great pitcher's fastball; a fake jump-shot from the baseline by Julius Irving would be morally indictable; and Roger Staubach would be prohibited from screaming "hut, hut, hut!!!" when specific orders had just been given for the center not to hike the ball "on hut" in order to draw the opposing defensive line off-sides. The "jocular lie" would be an abomination and the refusal to tell a lie could conceivably lead to the burlesque of "going the second mile" in order to tell the truth to your enemy even if it meant placing the lives of your neighbors in jeopardy.

Logically and Hermeneutically

BEWARE OF DOG signs tell us something more than what either mayor may not be in our backyards: They tell us to beware of misapplying Biblical generalizations. There is a Scriptural rule of logic that needs emphasizing-the fallacy of accident is that process by which we apply a general rule to a particular case whose "accidental" or providential circumstances render the rule inapplicable. Many general statements of Scripture must be open to admitting exceptions even though those qualifications are not immediately spelled out. Why are so many generalizations stated without qualification? Because the exact conditions restricting their applicability are not known, or because the "accidental)) or providential circumstances that render them inapplicable occur so seldom as to be practically negligible, or because such a qualification has already been stipulated in another inscripturated context. Jesus tells Peter, ". . . All they that take the sword shall perish with the sword," but in Romans 13 Paul approvingly speaks of the jus gladii of civil authority (Matthew 26:52, Romans 13:4). Prayer is another generalization where Jesus ostensibly teaches a carte blanche in one place, whereas the unanswered prayer of lust is condemned in another (Mark 11:24; James 4;3). Romans 7;1-3 seems to teach that if your husband is alive but you are married to another man, you are without qualification an adulteress. But Jesus' statement in Matthew 19:9, where fornication is enlisted as just ground for divorce and remarriage, is emphatically exceptional. The same applies to truth-telling, which is qualified by Scriptural precept and Scriptural example. On the one hand, there are generalizations that exalt truth-telling (Romans 12: 17); on the other hand, there is the inspired qualification (James 2:23; I Samuel 16:1-5). So we must register the logical point that what is right "in general" may not be universally and without qualification. This is the logical cliche of the exception proving the rule instead of negating it.

The Significance of the Ninth Commandment

The words, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor" mean exactly what the words indicate: It is morally unlawful to speak falsely against your neighbor. The force of this commandment is to protect human relationships as well as to foster love. Note: The commandment does not say that "thou shalt never tell a lie." Words are often more visceral than cerebral, and the word "lying" is not an exception; so a point on terminology: It needs to be underscored that there does not have to be a one-to-one correspondence between the English word and the Biblical word. Why? Because the languages are different. So we can be flexible on terminology as long as the point is clear. Connotatively, "lying" is an opprobrious term; denotatively, "lying" may not always be. For example, one ll?-ight say, "she lied, but did not bear false witness." The Bible, and not the Queen's English, must be our focus. That Rahab spoke falsely is incontrovertible; but that Rahab spoke falsely against her neighbor is what is denied. One cannot intelligently discuss the Ninth Commandment without contrasting the Western (Greek) and Hebrew conceptions of truth. As Dr. Hendrick Krabbendam has said;

The former pertains to the exposure of that which is hidden. The latter denotes dependability; constructive, rather than destructive ability. The Bible opposes truth as exposure (such as gossiping); but promotes truth as a constructive entity. See also the Ninth Commandment, "You shall not bear false witness." That is to say, you shall not illegally jeopardize one's standing or position in life. Hence, one must conclude that Rahab and the midwives were dependable and constructive at the risk of their own lives, in the face of attempted murder. This is a prime example of love toward God and their neighbor. 1

It is possible to speak the truth "in the Lord" and it is possible to do so "outside of the Lord" (such as gossip mongering). It is sometimes argued that Jesus never spoke an untruth, therefore we must never utter an untruth. Of course, this proves too much. If this was valid argumentation then it might be maintained that since there is no record that Jesus disobeyed Caesar, then we should never, or since Jesus never disobeyed His parents, we should never. The Apostles' "We ought to obey God rather than man" (Acts 5:29), as well as Jonathan's disobedience to his earthly head (I Samuel 20:30, 42), effectively counters this specious reasoning. Yet Jesus does command us to love our neighbor as ourselves, and Rahab's untruth mirrors this agape. The Ninth Commandment, as a litotes, does not scrap the idea of bearing false witness in behalf of your neighbor.

The Rahab Precedent

Rahab's falsehood in Joshua 2:4-6 is not an island by itself but one of many in a vast archipelago. The midwives lied to Pharaoh's gendarmes (Exodus 1: 15-20); Jael tricked Sisera to his doom and received the praise of God's prophetess (Judges 4:18-21; 5:24-27); Solomon's threat to divide the child was intended to trick the harlots and thereby extract the true confession of the rightful mother, albeit through a disavowal (herein was "the wisdom of God," 1 Kings 3: 28); Jeremiah's lie to the princes of Jerusalem is noteworthy (Jeremiah 38:24-28); there is the deception by the Lord Himself to conceal the true mission of Samuel (I Samuel 16:1-5; and see also I Kings 22: 19-23); Michal puts off Saul's dragoons with some blanket legerdemain (1 Samuel 19:12-17); David feigns a psychosis before Abimelech (the occasion of the praise of Psalm 34); David gives crafty counsel to Jonathan (1 Samuel 20:6, 28-29). These are a few of the praiseworthy actions of godly men and women bearing acceptable false witness.

Rahab's lie at Jericho is singled out for two important reasons: it is one of the first examples of pious subterfuge, and it is the occasion of a two-fold Apostolic imprimatur (Hebrews 11:31; James 2:23). Hebrews 11 states that Rahab "received the spies with peace." This was a work of faith. The receiving of the spies resulted in her not perishing with those who did not believe. This receiving is a synecdoche: The part stands for the whole. It certainly would be grotesque exegesis to limit the reception of the spies simply to their initial entrance into the house. Remember- Hebrews 11 as a kind of spiritual "Hall of Fame" records God's champions who are characterized by a valiant faith. The emphasis is not that the falsehood was a demonstration of a faith that works (James), or of a faith that is obedient (I Peter), or of a faith that is justifying (Romans), but the focus is on a faith that is courageous, since the issue of Rahab's life, the lives of the spies, the lives of the Israelite armed forces, and even the future of the theocracy and the birth of the Messiah were at stake.

Whom did Rahab receive? She received the spies. And what is a spy? In the Biblical context a spy is a secret agent who gains information about an enemy for the purpose of overthrowing that enemy (Joshua 2:1). A spy by definition relies upon the stratagem of falsehood, whether it be in words, behavior, or dress. In other words, Israel's God commissioned these spies to engage in a cloak and dagger operation, and Rahab showed the genuineness of her justifying faith by not only receiving the spies, but by becoming a Fifth Columnist herself.

James is the other New Testament writer who extols Rahab. Because James is interested in the fecundity of faith, he says that Rahab was justified by works (James 2:23-25). This means she was vindicated by her works; her works proved that she had been already justified by faith. Here it is said that she not only received the messengers, but "sent them out another way.)) (Another way-a way other than the way she told the soldiers of Jericho. Even if it is insisted that the text means she sent them out by a route other than the one they used when they entered the city, deception is still in view, for she let them down the wall by a cord [Joshua 2:15]. Thus, whichever way we take it, James is explicitly praising her act of deception.) Here is faith bursting out "at the seams!" Here is a comprehensive summary of faith's growth and expansion. Both the receiving of the deceivers and their emancipation is stressed. And what better way to emancipate a spy than to employ spy techniques?! Both the words of the deception and the spies' cooperation leading to the ensuing deliverance must be treated as unitive. They are distinctly correlatives, implying and implicating each other.

The spies wilily entered the city, wilily hid in the stalks of flax, while listening approvingly to Rahab's wily explanation to the Jericho authorities. The spies were un-coerced accomplices to Rahab's untruth so that when they fled the house they must have done so only when they were persuaded that their enemies were convincingly deceived. The mission of the spies was shrouded in deceit since it was a wartime mission when normal communication was impossible. Her sending the spies out "another way" was indeed hinged upon deceit, and hence could not be wrenched from that deceit. The falsehood then was not (as some have suggested) simply the fine dross of an otherwise golden action. The New Testament writers recognize bullion-gold when they see it, and praise Rahab to the hilt. R. J. Rushdoony accurately critiques the Rahab debunkers:

[Their criticism] involves wrongly dividing the word, trying to divide an act from itself, and denying that God's praise of the act was indeed praise. 2

Application and Conclusion

Two tasks remain: A disclaimer of situation ethics and an extension of the moral applications into our present scenario of living. First, the term "situation ethics" is, per se, one that we do not find to be repugnant for the simple reason that there is a situationalism for all ethics. The situationalism of the school of situation ethics, however, is a philosophy which seeks to promote a contentIess love in contexts where normal communication mayor may not have been broken. This has a double-feature: The love is anchorless since it is defined in terms other than the law of the Lord, and thus is reduced to sheer arbitrariness and feeling. Secondly, the situations where deceit is envisaged may be normal or abnormal, whereas we have limited them to the abnormal (that is, war against crime especially when life and possessions are at issue). The words of John Warwick Montgomery are a telling indictment of the school of situation ethics:

This brings us necessarily to a corollary of the ancient logical conundrum, treated at length by Bertrand Russell and others: 'If a Cretan tells you that all Cretans are liars, can you believe him?' Our restatement goes: 'If a situation ethicist holding to the proposition that the end justifies the means in love, and tells you that he is not lying, can you believe him?'3

The Bible states that love and the commandments of Christ are mutually affinitive. What is the law of the Lord but an elucidation of the demands of love? We must echo Montgomery again: in listening to the school of situation ethicists there is absolutely no way of determining, short of sodium pentothal, when they are telling the truth. Any degree of prevarication may be allowed on the basis of homage to love.

Keeping in mind that a Christian is always under a vow to refrain from speaking evil against his neighbor, we must make at least a limpid attempt to apply these principles. Lovers of fictitious canines can rest easier as well as wily vacationers who set their light to go on and off automatically. The Christian has no obligation to speak truthfully to those who have forfeited the right to hear the truth (Bonnie and Clyde citizen).

Because a Christian is always at war with crime he has the moral responsibility to lie, if necessary, to protect his neighbor. Since it is a responsibility mandated by God, it should not be defined as a "lesser of two evils" either. To make this contention is not only to deny that a lawful escape is always open (I Corinthians 10:13), but promote the practical effect of de-Christianizing the Christian by enslaving him in the old unconverted state where he is faced once again with "not possible not to sin" alternatives (Romans 3: 10-12; Matthew 7:17-18). So; in what contexts may the justifiable lie be rightly used? Some suggestions: A Christian may fake a heart attack if he is about to be robbed; he may speak falsehoods to totalitarian authorities when life itself is imperiled; he (she) may tell a rapist that she is a syphiloid or go into a pseudo-seizure to frighten him off; he may tell a thief that he has no money, and even place a BEWARE OF DOG sign on his fence when friendly neighbors as well as would-be thieves would be fooled. Camouflage in warfare is certainly lawful, and a Christian may properly engage in espionage. In 1969, for example, the North Koreans offered to return the crew of the US. S. Pueblo on condition that the United States confess that the ship was engaged in espionage in North Korean waters. Before making the "confession" to the North Koreans at Panmunjom, Major General Gilbert H. Woodward publicly stated that the admission was false and that he would sign the "confession" only to free the crew. Thus, he confessed to a lie before he told it!

The above are just some suggestions; they are not intended to teach that there may not be (in God's providence) some other stratagem that may be viable in particular situations. But let us also conclude with a warning not to use these principles as leverage for license to sin, either. Yet, it must also be concluded: These principles cannot be invalidated by their liability to abuse.

1. Dr. Hendrick Krabbendam, The Book ofJames, p. 22. This is a syllabus printed in 1973 for members of the Sunnyvale Orthodox Presbyterian Church and ministers of that denomination.

2. 2. R. J. Rushdoony, The Institutes oj Biblical Law (Nutley, New Jersey: The Craig Press, 1973), p. 545.

3. 3. John Warwick Montgomery, "Situation Morality: The Ethics of Immaturity," The Outlook (February, 1972), p. 22